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response to the remaining state variables should attenuate or be unaffected. In this way 
the central bank moves preemptively to reduce the risk of large deviations of the 
economy from the steady state that would deteriorate the distribution forecasts of the 
output gap and inflation. When an empirical test is carried out on the US economy the 
model predictions tend to be consistent with the data. 
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Abstract
This paper studies optimal real-time monetary policy when the cen-
tral bank takes the exogenous volatility of the output gap and ination
as proxy of the undistinguishable uncertainty on the exogenous distur-
bances and the parameters of its model. The paper shows that when
the exogenous volatility surrounding a specic state variable increases,
the optimal policy response to that variable should increase too, while
the optimal response to the remaining state variables should attenuate
or be una¤ected. In this way the central bank moves preemptively to
reduce the risk of large deviations of the economy from the steady state
that would deteriorate the distribution forecasts of the output gap and
ination. When an empirical test is carried out on the US economy the
model predictions tend to be consistent with the data.
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1 Introduction
A pervasive feature of monetary policymaking is the uncertainty about the
state of the economy, the economys structure and the inferences that the pub-
lic will draw from policy actions or economic developments (Bernanke 2007).
Policymakers have long recognized that coping with these forms of uncertainty
poses complicated issues in real-time monetary decisions. Uncertainty on the
output gap, for example, corresponds to uncertainty on where the economy
is located with respect to the business cycle. Thus real-time decisions, which
are necessarily based on output gap estimates, can turn out to be wrong from
an ex-post perspective. This problem is well documented by Orphanides and
van Norden (2002) who show that the reliability of the output gap measure is
quite low. Uncertainty on the structure of the economy is another key cause
of policy errors. This uncertainty stems from the limited knowledge of the
critical forces that govern the economic system at any point in time. Clearly,
the more these forces are missed in modeling the economy, the larger the pol-
icy errors. The problem raised by the uncertainty on the state and structure
of the economy is further aggravated by the di¢ culty to relate observable
changes in the volatility of key state variables as ination and output gap
to these sources of uncertainty. As noted by Bernanke (2007), Apart from
issues of measurement, policymakers face enormous challenges in determining
the sources of variation in the data.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under three fairly realistic
assumptions. The rst is that in real-time policymakers do not know with
certainty the exogenous disturbances to the economy and the parameters of
their model. Furthermore, they are unable to distinguish the impact of these
sources of uncertainty on the ination and output gap processes. Under these
assumptions some natural questions arise. Given the importance that modern
monetary policy attributes to the distribution forecast of ination and output
gap for policy actions, should the di¢ culty to tell in real-time the impact of
the various sources of uncertainty on these variables be considered by policy-
makers? And to what extent, if any, and how perceived changes in the level
of undistinguishable uncertainty should be considered? Given the current eco-
nomic conditions, these are timely questions. The US, for instance, witnessed
average real-time output gap volatility rising from 2.1% per annum over the
1997-2006 period to 2.6% per annum afterwards, and average GDP price in-
ation volatility rising from 0.3% per annum in 1997-2006 to 0.5% per annum
afterwards.
To address these questions, we introduce a nal assumption. We let pol-
icymakers use their judgment to form an opinion on the level of exogenous
volatility surrounding the demand and supply side of the economy, which can
be interpreted as the perceived level of exogenous volatility for the ination
and output gap processes. Then, policymakers take this volatility as a proxy
for the level of undistinguishable uncertainty in the exogenous disturbances
and the model parameters.
These assumptions get reected in a stylized two-step representation of the
central bank decision process. First, central banks estimate at a certain time
frequency the state and model of the economy being aware that the estimates
are surrounded by uncertainty. Second, at a higher frequency, policymakers
assess the amount of uncertainty of the estimates using as proxies of the undis-
tinguishable uncertainty the exogenous volatility of the ination and output
gap processes and take better-informed policy decisions.
Methodologically, the analysis is performed by introducing a New-
Keynesian model that conveniently accounts for undistinguishable uncertainty
in the state and structure of the economy. We then estimate the model and
use the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic approach developed by Svensson and
Williams (2007) to study how optimal monetary policy responds to changes
in the exogenous output gap and ination volatilities as proxies of uncertainty
about the state and structure of the economy. Finally, we test the theoretical
results on US data.
Previous literature has studied optimal monetary policy in presence of mul-
tiplicative uncertainty. The initial idea that model uncertainty requires some
cautiousness in policy decisions, as suggested by the Brainards (1967) semi-
nal contribution, has been revised by Söderström (2002) who rst shows, in a
backward-looking model, that in presence of uncertainty on the ination per-
sistence monetary policy should be more aggressive. Kimura and Kurozumi
(2007) extend the analysis to a New-Keynesian model with a hybrid Phillips
curve and where the uncertainty on the ination persistence makes also un-
certain the social welfare loss that the central bank wants to minimize. The
results of Kimura and Kurozumi are in line with Söderströms work and both
papers mark an important deviation from the conventional wisdom originated
by Brainards article and corroborated by the subsequent literature1. Our
contribution, with respect to this line of research, lies in studying optimal
monetary policy when the central bank considers the undistinguishable uncer-
tainty on the model parameters and the exogenous disturbances proxied by
the perceived level of uncertainty surrounding the demand and supply sides
1See, among others, Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Hall et al. (1999), Martin and Salmon
(1999), Svensson (1999), Sack (2000).
of the economy. Within a Markov jump linear quadratic framework, this
paper shows that when the exogenous volatility surrounding a state variable
increases, the optimal policy response to that variable should increase too,
while the optimal response to the remaining state variables should attenuate
or be una¤ected. Empirically, when a test is carried out on the US economy
the model predictions tend to be consistent with the data. This result matters
for policy in that when policymakers have real-time limited information on the
sources of uncertainty, nonetheless perceive shifts in the relative volatility of
ination and output gap, they may exploit this information to ne-tune the
policy response to the state variables.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the theoretical model. In section 3 we estimate the aggregate demand and
supply, (henceforth AD and AS) using US data. In section 4 we use the es-
timates of the AD and AS along with a standard calibration for the central
bank preferences to nd the optimal monetary policy when central bank deci-
sions consider the volatility level on the ination and output gap process. Our
theoretical predictions are then tested on US monetary policy data. Section 5
provides some robustness analysis and Section 6 summarizes our ndings and
o¤ers some conclusions.
2 Theoretical model
The behavior of the private sector is captured by a New-Keynesian model with
realistic monetary policy transmission lags and inertia in the behavior of house-
holds and rms. The model is derived from microfoundations2 and is similar
in spirit to Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Flamini (2007). Specically, while
it shares with both a special attention in describing accurately the dynamics
of the private sector, it mainly di¤ers from the former in considering optimal
monetary policy instead of a forward-looking Taylor rule and from the latter in
focusing on a closed economy rather than an open economy. Furthermore, the
current model nds the optimal monetary policy in presence of multiplicative
uncertainty following the Markov-jump linear quadratic approach developed
by Svensson and Williams (2007). The AD and AS are respectively described
by the following relations
yt+1 =

yyt + (1  y) yt+2jt   rrt + "yt+1

yt+1; (1)
t+2 =

t+1 + (1  )t+3jt + yyt+2jt + "t+2

t+2 (2)
2See Appendix A for details.
where for any variable x the expression xt+ jt denotes the rational expectation
of x in period t +  conditional on the information available in period t; all
the variables are in terms of log deviations from constant steady state values,
yt; rt; t denote output gap, real short term interest rate, and ination rate,
respectively, with rt  it   t+1jt and it denoting the short term nominal
interest rate, and nally, "y and " are exogenous disturbances allowing the
economy to depart from the steady state.
The presence of the factors yt and 

t is an innovation with respect to the
previous literature. yt and 

t are random variables capturing the uncertainty
on the state and structure of the economy assuming that in real-time it is
impossible for the central bank to distinguish the impact of these sources of
uncertainty on the volatility of the output gap and ination processes. This
assumption is motivated by the fact that in real-time policymakers face di¢ -
culties in observing specic disturbances hitting the economy and have limited
knowledge on their properties too. Furthermore, the true model of the econ-
omy is not known with certainty so that even if there were full knowledge of
the disturbances, di¢ culties would arise in nowcasting and forecasting their
impact on the economy.
To model the assumption of undistinguishable uncertainties, we let yt
and t have a symmetric distribution, expected value equal to one and vari-
ance proportional to the exogenous volatility of the ination and output gap
processes as we will discuss below. At any point in time, a value of the factors
di¤erent from one can capture uncertainty on the stochastic properties of the
exogenous disturbances hitting the economy and/or uncertainty in the central
bank estimates of the model parameters. Regarding the former, an example
can be a preference or a technology shock which occurred in the previous pe-
riod and that turns out to be more persistent than expected. On the other
hand, uncertainty in the estimates of the model parameters can be caused by
their possible time varying nature which is missed by the policymakers3. In
this case, yt and 

t record general model uncertainty, that is, uncertainty that
stems from the structure of the model and that is impossible to attribute to
specic parameters in real-time.
While the coe¢ cients of the AS and AD can be estimated at a xed fre-
quency, the information ow accessible to central bank and relevant for policy
decisions is continuous and sometimes not apt for a direct use in the estimation
process. Nevertheless, this information ow can be useful for policymakers to
form an opinion on the variance of yt and 

t . To model this idea we as-
3See Rubio-Ramirez and Villaverde (2007) for empirical evidence in favour of parameter
drifting in DSGE models and the literature therein for empirical evidence on time varying
parameters in dynamic models.
sume that policymakers use all the available information and their judgment
to form an opinion on the exogenous volatility of the ination and output gap
processes. Then, they consider this volatility as proxy for the variance of yt
and t in the determination of the optimal monetary policy.
Within this framework, the central bank optimization problem consists of
nding the interest rate path that maximizes its preferences subject to the AD
and AS and to the opinion on the level of uncertainty proxied by the exogenous
volatility of the ination and output gap processes. Turning to central bank
preferences, they are described by the following standard loss function
Et
1X
=0


2t+ + y
2
t+ +  (it+   it+ 1)2

; (3)
where ;  and  are weights that express the preferences of the central bank for
the ination and output gap stabilization targets, and the instrument smooth-
ing target, respectively. Regarding the interest rate smoothing preference for a
central bank that pursues ination targeting see, for example, Svensson (2010),
p. 2, Holmsen et al. (2008), and Woodford (2003).
2.1 Optimal monetary policy with Non-certainty Equiv-
alence
In our analysis we let the central bank consider undistinguishable uncertainty
via multiplicative shocks. On the one hand, the use of a multiplicative rather
than additive shock is consistent with the multiplicative nature of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the structural parameters and the properties of the exoge-
nous disturbances. On the other hand, it provides a convenient way of inves-
tigating optimal monetary policy in presence of uncertainty. It is well known,
in fact, that the linear-quadratic setup features certainty equivalence, which
implies that optimal monetary policy does not depend on additive uncertainty.
Instead, considering yt and 

t as multiplicative shocks we can relax the cer-
tainty equivalence assumption and study how uncertainty a¤ects the optimal
policy. Relaxing the certainty equivalence assumption is also important in that
allows us to introduce a key realistic aspect of monetary policy, namely the
policymakersfocus on the distribution forecasts of the target variables rather
than the mean forecasts.
We follow this route by assuming a discrete support for yt and 

t and that
in any period these shocks can take nj di¤erent values corresponding to nj
exogenous modes drawn by nature and indexed by jt 2 f1; 2; :::; njg : Thus yt
and t correspond to 
y
jt
and jt, respectively. Then, the Markov Jump-Linear-
Quadratic approach developed by Svensson and Williams (2007a) and further
discussed in Svensson and Williams (2007b) is adopted to solve the central
bank optimization problem in presence of multiplicative shocks4. Thus, we let
the mode jt follow a Markov process with constant transition probabilities and
start by assuming that each transition probabilities has the same value
Pjk  Pr fjt+1 = kjjt = jg = 1
nj
; 8 j; k 2 f1; 2; :::; njg : (4)
Next, let P  [Pjk] be the Markov transition matrix and p 
 
p1t; :::; pnjt
0
(with pjt  Pr fjt = jg) the central banks subjective probability distribution
over the modes in period t:We now assume that the central bank does not ob-
serve the modes and that does not update its subjective distribution of modes
through the observation of the economy5. Thus its subjective distribution
pt 
 
p1t; :::; pnjt
0
evolves according to the exogenous transition probabilities,
that is
pt+ = (P
0) pt;   0: (5)
As to the central bank knowledge before choosing the instrument it at the
beginning of period t; the information set consists of the transition matrix
P; the central banks subjective probability distribution over the modes in
period t and subsequent periods via (5); the nj di¤erent values that each of
the matrices can take in any mode and, nally, the realizations of Xt.
Given (4), the unique stationary distribution of the modes associated with
the Markov transition matrix P is a uniform distribution. Thus the tran-
sition probabilities described by (4) capture the case of generalized modes
uncertainty in which modes are serially i.i.d. The motivation to consider this
case lies in the interest of studying optimal monetary policy when the cen-
tral bank has a minimal knowledge on the multiplicative shocks, specically
it only knows their bands and considers any realization as equally likely. In
section 5, to check for the robustness of the results, we explore an alternative
assumption where the modes exhibit some persistence. We now assume that
there are nj = 5 modes so that the stationary distribution for the shock hjt ;
4Our analysis follows the approach presented in Svensson and Williams (2007a).
5Svensson and Williams (2007a) base the no-learning perspective on the forgetting the
past assumption according to which, when the central bank and the private sector make
decisions in period t; they forget past observations of the economy so that they cannot use
current observations to update their beliefs.
for h = y; ; is given by
hjt
 
1  2h
  
1  h

1
 
1 + h
  
1 + 2h

Pr
 
hjt

0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2 0:2
with the parameter h allowing to change the variance of the distribution.
Moreover, we assume that the multiplicative shocks and the additive exogenous
disturbances to the economy are independent so that modes jt and innovations
"t are independently distributed6.
Summing up, the central bank cannot observe the modes yet nd the op-
timal monetary policy
it = iit 1 + (1  i)
 
t+1jt + yyt

(6)
taking into account the volatility of the multiplicative shocks through its in-
formation set7.
3 Model estimation
To choose the coe¢ cients of the AD and AS equations (1) and (2), we jointly
estimate these and the monetary policy equation in (3) using US data for
the period 1969Q4-2009Q2. We use the E¤ective Federal Funds rate as the
nominal interest rate. Ination is the annual proportional change in the GDP
price index. For ination, we (i) use real-time median forecasts of GDP price
ination obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) database
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and (ii) replace GDP
price ination forecasts with their actual values. The output gap is proxied
by (i) real-time output detrended by a quadratic trend, (ii) real-time output
detrended by a Hodrick-Presott (1997) trend, (iii) nal output detrended by
the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO) measure of potential GDP, and (iv)
nal-time output detrended by a Hodrick-Presott (1997) trend. To construct
the real-time output gap data, we estimate for each quarter both a quadratic
and a Hodrick-Prescott trend using real-time output data available in that
6The driving forces in this economy are the the additive disturbances "t and the multi-
plicative shocks modeled through the modes jt: Diferently from multiplicative shocks, the
presence of additive disturbances does not have any e¤ect on the optimal monetary policy
due to certainty equivalence. Nonetheless, in the New-Keynesian model where variables
denote log-deviations from steady state values, the role of additive disturbances is to allow
the economy departing from the steady state equilibrium.
7Details of the application of the Svensson and Williams approach are reported in Ap-
pendix B.
quarter. The output gap for the quarter is the end-of-sample residual from that
quadratic trend and Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend regressions, respectively.
This means, for example, that in constructing the output gap data for the
period 1969Q4 to 2009Q2 (159 quarters), we re-estimated 159 regressions8.
To tackle the end-point problem in calculating the HP trend (see Mise et
al, 2005a,b), we applied an autoregressive AR(n) model (with n set at 4 to
eliminate serial correlation) to each of the real-time and nal-time output
measures. The AR model was used to forecast six additional quarters that
were then added to each of the series before applying the HP lter. Figure
1 plots the federal funds rate and the di¤erent measures of ination and the
output gap. The federal funds rate is higher during the 1970s and early 1980s
and reaches its lowest level following the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. Ination
is higher during the 1970s and early 1980s; it also rises towards the end of
our sample. Compared to the other output gap measures, real-time output
detrended by a quadratic trend lter suggests a more severe downturn in the
mid-1970s and following the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. The two HP output
gap measures move very much in line with each other (these have a correlation
of 0.88). Empirical estimates using these two measures produced qualitatively
similar results. In what follows, and in order to save space, we only report
estimates using the real-time HP output gap measure (results based on the
nal-time HP output gap measure are available on request).
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are estimated jointly using the continuously
updated Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator of Hansen et al
(1996) with a constant, four lags of the interest rate, four lags of ination and
four lags of the output gap as instruments for all three equations. Column (i)
of Table 1 reports real-time estimates with output detrended by a quadratic
trend and with SPF ination forecasts; column (ii) reports real-time estimates
with output detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott trend and with SPF ination
forecasts, and column (iii) reports nal estimates with output detrended by
the CBO measure of potential output and with ination forecasts replaced by
actual ination values. We also report the systems J statistic which tests the
validity of the instruments used (Hansen, 1982). We estimate that the weight
on ination ranges from 1.53 to 2.12; the weight on the output gap ranges
from 1.07 to 1.56 and the persistence parameter ranges from 0.83 to 0.90. Our
estimates indicate a more aggressive response of policymakers to ination and
the output gap using real-time as opposed to nal data.
8Preliminary unit root analysis (results are available on request) indicated that the output
gap is stationary whereas the order of integration of the interest rate and ination is more
ambiguous; we assume that all variables are stationary (see e.g. Clarida et al, 2000, for a
discussion of similar issues).
Figure 1: Federal funds rate, inflation and output gap data 
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Table 1: Simple Taylor rule model estimates using GMM 
Sample: 1969Q4-2009Q2 
      (i)       (ii)    (iii) 
Interest rate equation    
i  0.83 (0.03)  0.90 (0.03)  0.89 (0.02) 
   2.12 (0.31)  1.98 (0.50)  1.53 (0.30) 
y   1.16 (0.26)  1.56 (0.85)  1.07 (0.47) 
    
Adjusted R2  0.92  0.90  0.93 
Regression SE  0.94  0.95  0.89 
    
Output gap equation    
y   0.53 (0.03)  0.51 (0.01)  0.54 (0.02) 
r   0.05 (0.02)  0.05 (0.01)  0.06 (0.02) 
Adjusted R2  0.95  0.85  0.96 
Regression SE  0.53  0.67  0.52 
    
Inflation equation    
   0.91 (0.04)  0.83 (0.03)  0.51 (0.02) 
y   0.11 (0.03)  0.06 (0.01)  0.03 (0.01) 
Adjusted R2  0.97  0.95  0.98 
Regression SE  0.42  0.38  0.20 
J stat [0.35] [0.32] [0.35] 
 
Notes: All models include an intercept term; estimates of this are not reported. 
(i): Real-time estimates. These use output detrended by a quadratic trend. 
(ii): Real-time estimates. These use output detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott trend. 
(iii) Final estimates. These use output detrended by the CBO measure of potential output. 
 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. J stat is the p-value of a chi-
square test of the system’s overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). The instruments are a 
constant, four lags of the interest rate, inflation and the output gap.  
 
The ination estimates are in line with other results in the literature (e.g.
Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, Clarida et al, 2000, Castelnuovo, 2003, Alcidi et
al. 2009, and Martin and Milas, 2009) and satisfy the Taylor (1993) principle
that excessive ination should trigger increases in the real interest rate9.
Our estimates suggest that the weight on past output in the aggregate
demand equation ranges between 0.51 and 0.54 whereas the weight on past
ination in the aggregate supply equation ranges between 0.51 and 0.91. The
estimates of the AS imply that backward looking ination e¤ects are more
important than forward looking ones. This is in line with Rudd and Whelan
(2005) and Linde (2005) but contradicts e.g. Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali et
al (2005) and Kim and Kim (2008). The model with nal data ts monetary
policy and the AD and AS equations best as it delivers the lowest regression
standard error and the highest adjusted R2. This nding is consistent with
other evidence that policymakers do not respond to real-time output data, for
example in the context of scal policy (see for example IMF, 2008, chapter
5). One interpretation of this nding is that estimates of policy rules based
on nal data may be misleading since they assume a policy response to data
policymakers did not possess at the time (e.g. Orphanides and van Norden,
2005). An alternative interpretation is that policymakers do not in fact place
that much weight on real-time data, which according to Adam and Cobham
(2004), does not correspond precisely to what researchers would like - the
output gap as understood at the time by policymakers - which seems nearly
impossible to identify.
Finally, it is worth making the following points. First, since the system is
estimated jointly, the performance of the di¤erent variants of the policy rule
depends on the t of the other equations in the model. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the t of the estimated equations is contingent on having
allowed for the smoothing interest rate coe¢ cient to vary between the di¤erent
specications in Table 1. Third, due to endpoint problems with the HP lter,
specication (i) is much more trustworthy than specication (ii). However, as
mentioned above, we have tried to hedge against this problem by extending
the GDP series using the AR forecasts before applying the HP lter.
9Gerberding et al (2005) and Gerdesmeier and Ro¢ a (2005) nd that the use of real-
time output data as opposed to nal output data increases the output e¤ect in the Taylor
rule for the Bundesbank and the EU area, respectively. A possible explanation is that the
magnitude of the response using revised data could su¤er from downward bias owing to the
errors-in-variables problem.
4 Optimal monetary policy response to out-
put gap and ination uncertainty
This section starts by presenting the theoretical predictions of the model con-
sidering the separate and joint impact of the exogenous level of ination and
output gap volatility on the optimal monetary policy. It then tests the model
empirically using US data.
4.1 Theoretical predictions of the model
We choose the parameter values for the AD and AS equations based on the
nal-time estimates reported in column (iii) of Table 1 (which t the data
best). We then compute the optimal monetary policy response to changes in
the volatility of the ination and output gap processes under the assumption,
common in the literature, that the central bank pursues exible ination tar-
geting and wishes to smooth the interest rate path (that is,  = 1,  = 0:1
and  = 0:2)10.
In our model the vector of state variables is given by Xt =
 
t; t+1jt; yt;
it 1)
0 so that due to the Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic setup, the optimal
monetary policy, for a given value of multiplicative uncertainty, is a linear
function of Xt11: Since the optimal coe¢ cient for current ination, t; is al-
ways zero, the optimal policy turns out to depend only on
 
t+1jt; yt; it 1

as
anticipated in (6): Furthermore, in order to allow comparisons of the coe¢ cient
for ination and output-gap with much of the earlier literature, we present the
results of the analysis in terms of the long-run optimal monetary policy
it = t+1jt + yyt;
and discuss separately at the end of section 4.1.1. the relation between uncer-
tainty and the optimal policy response to the lagged interest rate12.
Figure 2 reports the coe¢ cients of the optimal monetary policy for increas-
ing values of the standard deviations of yjt and 

jt, i.e. y and . The range
of the standard deviations has been chosen in order to obtain a realistic mea-
10We focus on exible ination targeting as, in practice, no ination targeting central
bank pursues strict ination targeting.
11Although t+1jt is an expectation, in the model with a two-period policy transmission
lag to a¤ect ination this variable is predetermined and thus belongs to the vector of the
state variables. This can be easily seen by lagging the aggregate supply one period and then
taking the expectation at time t: In section 5, we relax the assumption of policy transmission
lags and consequently t+1jt is no longer a state variable.
12Given the short-run policy (6), the long-run policy turns out to be it = t+1jt+ yyt:
sure of the volatility for the output and ination one-period ahead forecast
errors. As to the former, we assumed that the upper bound of the standard
deviation of the shock to the output gap is 0.4. It follows that, in any period
t, due to the presence of uncertainty captured by the factor yjt, actual output
gap may di¤er from the one-period ahead forecast of, at the most, 56 percent-
age points of its value13. For example, if the expected value of the output gap
based on the period t information set is 1%, then its actual value in period
t + 1 may shift at the most to 0.44% or 1.56%. This range is in line with
the low reliability of output gap estimates in real-time discussed for example
by Orphanides and van Norden (2002) who nd that ex-post revisions of the
real-time output gap estimates can be of the same order of magnitude as the
output gap itself. Turning to ination, we let  2 [0; 0:175] so that in any
period t actual ination may di¤er from the one-period ahead forecast of, at
the most, 25 percentage points of its value. This level of the variability of
ination is consistent with the view that forecasting errors related to ination
estimates tend to be less than half the ones related to output gap estimates14.
Describing our ndings, rst Figure 2 (a, b) shows that the optimal re-
sponse to a state variable increases in the level of exogenous volatility sur-
rounding that variable. Since the admissible range of output gap volatility is
more than two times as large as the one of ination volatility, this increase
is remarkably large for the optimal response to the output gap in presence of
output gap volatility.
To gain the intuition for this result it is useful to recall that relaxing the
certainty equivalence assumption the central bank objective is to have the
distribution forecasts of ination and the output gap that look good. In
this model, the quality of the distribution forecasts, measured for instance by
their volatility, is negatively a¤ected by two factors: the perceived exogenous
volatility in the ination and output gap processes and the distance of the
economy from its long-run equilibrium. While the role played by the former
is evident, to see the role played by the latter consider that due to the multi-
plicative nature of the shock capturing the exogenous volatility in the ination
and output gap processes, the further away is the economy from the long-run
equilibrium, the larger is the impact of the shock for a given level of its volatil-
ity. Now, when there is an exogenous increase in the volatility of the shocks,
the length of the potential deviations of the economy from its steady state
increases and may combine with the second factor in a self-enforcing cycle
13Given the uniform distribution for yj reported before, when y 2 [0; 0:4] it follows that
yj 2 [0:44; 1:56] :
14See Sims (2002) for the root mean square errors of several US ination and output
growth estimates including the Green Book ones.
that quickly deteriorates the distribution forecasts. To take this contingency
into account monetary policy needs to move preemptively. It thus gets more
reactive in presence of an increase in the volatility of the ination and output
gap.
Figure 2 also shows that the optimal response to ination is inversely re-
lated to output gap volatility, whereas the optimal response to the output gap
tends to be unrelated to ination volatility; see panels (a) and (b) respectively.
This symmetry breaking occurs as output gap volatility introduces a trade-o¤
between the quality of the distribution forecasts for ination and the output
gap. In contrast, the presence of ination volatility does not introduce a sim-
ilar trade-o¤. To see the mechanism at work, let us consider the behavior of
the central bank in two di¤erent scenarios. In the rst one, ination deviates
from its long-run value, i.e.  6= 0; in presence of output gap volatility; in
the second one, the output gap deviates from its long-run value, i.e. y 6= 0;
in presence of ination volatility. In the rst case, the policymakersattempt
to stabilize ination requires a deviation of the output gap from its long-run
value. This implies a loss for the central bank. However, the presence of out-
put gap volatility now adds a further loss as it makes it potentially harder
to take the output gap back to the equilibrium in the subsequent periods.
Thus, policymakers will trade-o¤ slower ination stabilization for smaller de-
terioration of the output gap distribution forecast. This gets reected in an
attenuation of the policy response to ination. Conversely, when the output
gap deviates from its long-run value and the central bank faces ination un-
certainty, the attempt to stabilize the output gap will not require a deviation
of ination from its long-run value. On the contrary, by stabilizing the output
gap, policymakers prevent output gap deviations from perturbing ination via
the Phillips curve. This explains why the policy response to the output gap is
not a¤ected by ination uncertainty.
The result that accounting for uncertainty can lead to a more aggressive
policy has precedents in the literature. Söderström (2002), with a backward-
looking model found that the policy responsiveness to ination increases with
the uncertainty on the persistence of this variable. Extending the analysis
with a microfounded forward-looking model where policymakers minimize a
social welfare loss, Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) conrmed this result. The
current paper, abstracting from specic sources of uncertainty considered in
previous contributions, suggests that a more aggressive policy response to a
state variable should occur when the exogenous overall volatility surrounding
that variable increases. It is worth noting that, in real-time, information on
changes in specic sources of uncertainty seems more di¢ cult to gather than
general information on variations in the uncertainty of the output gap and
ination processes. Thus, the previous result matters for policy design in that
it unveils the utility of limited information on the general uncertainty in the
output gap and ination processes when central banks cannot rely on detailed
information on the uncertainty sources.
We also note that a distinct implication of the papers multiplicative set-up
is that the forecasting precision is negatively correlated with the size of the
output gap and the level of ination as implied by the multiplicative speci-
cation of the IS equation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. In other
words, the further the economy departs from the steady state, the more di¢ -
cult it becomes to forecast the evolution of the economy. One practical way
of assessing this is to compare, for instance, the Bank of Englands fan chart
for GDP growth in the pre-crisis Ination Report of February 2007 with that
at the height of the recession in the Ination Report of August 2009 (both
reports are available from the website of the Bank of England). The former
forecasts GDP growth in the (0.75%, 4.75%) range whereas the latter forecasts
a much wider GDP growth range of (-1%, 5.5%). This highlights the di¢ culty
in forecasting the further away the economy moves from equilibrium.
4.1.1 Optimal policy responses with both ination and output gap
volatility
So far we have considered the case in which the exogenous volatility surround-
ing one process (either the output gap or ination) increases as the volatility
surrounding the other process is constant. While investigating this scenario
has been instructive to see the specic contributions of  and y on the op-
timal policy, a more realistic one occurs when both processes are surrounded
by exogenous uncertainty and, in real-time, policymakers perceive shifts in the
volatility of one process relative to the volatility of the other process.
To study this case, we introduce an output gap relative volatility ratio
and investigate how the optimal policy reacts to changes in this ratio. We
dene the output gap relative volatility ratio as y= (y + ) and impose the
following inverse relation between y and 
y = y   y

;
where y = 0:4 and  = 0:175 refer to the upper bound for the volatility of
the output gap and ination processes, respectively. Thus
y
y + 
=
1
1  y 
y

   1

1
1  y 
y

:
Figure 2:  Optimal policy response to yt and πt+1|t in presence of uncertainty on the output 
gap and inflation processes. Central bank preferences:  μ=1, λ=0.1, ν=0.2. 
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Figure 3: Optimal policy response to yt and πt+1|t in presence of relative output gap 
uncertainty. Central bank preferences: μ=1, λ=0.1, ν=0.2. 
 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that the ratio is equal to zero if and only if there is
maximum volatility in the ination processes and no volatility in the output
gap process; on the other hand, it is equal to one if and only if there is
maximum volatility in the output gap process and no volatility in the ination
process, that is
y
y + 
=

0 i¤  = ; y = 0
1 i¤  = 0; y = y
:
We also note that the level of overrall exogenous volatility, y+; associated
with the relative output gap volatility is comparable to the cases analyzed in
the previous section where either exogenous output gap volatility or ination
volatility was considered. In particular, the overall exogenous volatility is
at least (at most) equal to the maximum volatility that we had with only
exogenous ination (output-gap) volatility, that is y +  2 [0:175; 0:4] :
Figure 3 plots the optimal policy coe¢ cients for the output gap and ina-
tion versus the output gap relative volatility ratio. Figure 3 shows that when
the volatility in the output gap is inversely related to the volatility in ination,
movements in the volatilities of y and  should be associated with changes in
the same direction of the policy response to these variables. Furthermore,
by equally splitting the y and  volatility ranges we notice that with more
volatility in the ination process than the output gap process (region A), the
optimal monetary policy tends to react more to ination than to the output
gap in a fashion similar to what predicted by the Taylor rule. Instead, in the
opposite case (region B), the policy response to the output gap exceeds the
one to ination. Finally, in region B, the spread between the policy responses
is remarkably larger than in region A and the response to the less volatile state
variable tends to become negligible, while it remains important in region A.
This latter response is in line with the breaking symmetry e¤ect previously
described, which is caused by the di¤erent impact of the y and  volatility on
the optimal policy.
Summing up, these ndings show that also in the more realistic case in
which policymakers face uncertainty in both processes, there is (i) a positive
relation between the volatility of a state variable and reactiveness of the asso-
ciated policy response, and (ii) an asymmetric policy behavior associated with
movements in the relative volatility.
It is important to note that the results presented in section 4.1. and 4.1.1
show the optimal long-run policy response to ination and the output gap
taking implicitly into consideration the role played by the optimal response
to the lagged interest rate, i.e the degree of optimal policy inertia. When
we focus on the short-run optimal policy, which reveals optimal coe¢ cients
for
 
t+1jt; yt; it 1

; we have the coe¢ cient for it 1 falling monotonically for
increasing values of y and the same qualitative behavior for the response to 
t+1jt; yt

. Thus with only output-gap uncertainty, or more output gap uncer-
tainty relative to ination uncertainty, monetary policy becomes less inertial.
Since in these two cases the optimal response to the output gap gets larger
than the response to ination, less inertia turns out to amplify more the re-
sponse to the output gap than the response to ination. This explains why the
di¤erence in these responses is larger in presence of output gap uncertainty15.
4.2 Empirical application on US monetary policy
The theoretical predictions reported in Figure 3 are now tested on USmonetary
policy over the 1969Q4-2009Q2 period. We construct the volatility measures
yt, t, and the relative volatility ratio

y
y+

t
, respectively, by taking the
8-quarter moving standard deviation of ination and the output gap (results
using a 16-quarter moving standard deviation are qualitatively similar). Our
measures of volatility are reported in Figure 4. Ination volatility is greatest in
the 1970s, and towards the end of our sample. Output gap volatility declines
throughout the 1980s with resurgences in the early 1990s, after the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, and following the nancial crisis at the end of our sample. We
have also considered as measures of shock uncertainty the Root Mean Square
Errors for output and ination instead; empirical results based on these very
measure were poor compared to the ones reported below.
To allow for asymmetric volatility e¤ects, we express the monetary policy
rule as:
it = iit 1 + (1  i) Iy=(y+)t

+;0 + 
+
;1

y
y + 

t

t+1jt
+ (1  i) Iy=(y+)t

+y;0 + 
+
y;1

y
y + 

t

yt (7)
+ (1  i)
h
1  Iy=(y+)t
i 
 ;0 + 
 
;1

y
y + 

t

t+1jt
+ (1  i)
h
1  Iy=(y+)t
i 
 y;0 + 
 
y;1

y
y + 

t

yt
15Specically, focusing on the optimal coe¢ cient for the lagged interest rate, we nd that
with only increasing output gap uncertainty this coe¢ cient falls over the range [0:66; 0:48] ;
with only increasing ination uncertainty it falls over the range [0:66; 0:65], and nally with
increasing relative output-gap uncertainty it falls over the range [0:65; 0:48] : To save space
we do not plot the response to the lagged interest rate but this is available on request.
where Iy=(y+)t is the indicator function:
I
y=(y+)
t =
8<: 1; if

y
y+

t


y
y+

t 1
0; if

y
y+

t
<

y
y+

t 1
(8)
Model (7) using the indicator function (8) di¤ers from the linear Taylor rule
model (6) in that it allows for a regime-switching relationship between the
interest rate, ination and the output gap depending on whether there is higher
relative volatility in the output gap process (in which case increasing values of
y
y+

t
are observed) against higher relative volatility in the ination process
(in which case decreasing values of

y
y+

t
are observed). The response
to ination switches from +;0 + 
+
;1

y
y+

t
when there is higher relative
volatility in the output gap process to  ;0+
 
;1

y
y+

t
when there is higher
relative volatility in the ination process.
Similarly, the response to the output gap switches from +y;0+
+
y;1

y
y+

t
to  y;0 + 
 
y;1

y
y+

t
. We expect higher relative volatility in the output gap
process to raise the response of monetary policy to the output gap
 
+y;1 > 0

and lower the response of monetary policy to ination
 
+;1 < 0

. On the
other hand, higher relative volatility in the ination process should lower the
response of monetary policy to the output gap
 
 y;1 < 0

and increase the
response to ination
 
 ;1 > 0

. The model in (7) simplies to a model with
symmetric volatility e¤ects if +y;0 = 
 
y;0, 
+
y;1 =   y;1, +;0 =  ;0, and +;1 =
  ;1.
To allow for multiplicative uncertainty e¤ects, the model in (7) is estimated
jointly with the AD-AS equations (1) and (2) where the crossproduct shocks
y and  are proxied by y and , respectively. To save space, we only
report estimates of (7) in Table 2 (estimates of (1-2) are very similar to those
reported in Table 1 and are available on request). We estimate that +y;1 > 0,
+;1 < 0, 
 
y;1 < 0, and 
 
;1 > 0. These estimates are statistically signicant,
suggesting that higher (lower) relative volatility in the output gap process
raises (lowers) the response of monetary policy to the output gap and lowers
(raises) the response to ination. All three models estimated in columns (i)-
(iii) of Table 2 t the data better than the corresponding models in Table 1.
Therefore, both ination and output gap volatility matter for US monetary
policy. Amongst all estimated models, the model with nal data (reported
in column (iii) of Table 2) delivers the best t. For this model, the average
output gap response drops from 1.61 when there is higher relative volatility
in the output gap to 1.48 when there is higher relative volatility in ination.
On the other hand, the average ination response increases from 1.49 when
there is higher relative volatility in the output gap to 1.56 when there is higher
relative volatility in ination. Consistent with Figure 3, the average output
gap response is higher (lower) than the average ination response when there
is higher (lower) relative volatility in the output gap process. These average
estimates provide some evidence of asymmetries in the response to ination
and the output gap when volatility is considered.
Estimates of the real-time models (in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 2) also
suggest that the average ination response increases when there is higher rel-
ative volatility in ination. On the other hand, the output gap response in-
creases when there is higher relative output gap volatility for the model in
column (i) but not for the one in column (ii); the latter nding is arguably
due to the +y;0 coe¢ cient being imprecisely estimated.
To x ideas, we discuss the implications of equation (7) for optimal mon-
etary policy in the U.S. using the estimates in column (i) of Table 2. First,
consider the case where the U.S. economy experiences a Japanese style dea-
tion with low ination as well as low ination volatility in one period followed
by an even lower ination volatility in the next period (such that the relative
ination volatility ratio drops). In this case, the average response of policy-
makers to ination is equal to 1.88, whereas the average response to the output
gap is equal to 0.90. Contrast the above responses with the case where the
U.S. economy experiences a 1970s style increase in ination volatility, with
ination volatility in one period followed by an even higher ination volatility
in the next period (such that the relative ination volatility ratio rises). In this
case, policymakers become more concerned with ination and less concerned
with output gap uctuations, as the average response to ination rises from
1.88 to 2.12, whereas the average response to the output gap drops from 0.90
to 0.85.
We have also estimated alternative volatility measures based on the struc-
tural shocks derived from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) system with six lags
(chosen by the Akaike Information Criterion) in output gap, ination and the
interest rate. Using the above ordering, we have identied the structural out-
put gap, ination and interest rate shocks using the Cholesky decomposition
(for more details of the structural VAR approach see e.g. Amisano and Gian-
nini, 1997). As an alternative, we have augmented the VAR with commodity
price ination (based on the spot price index of all commodities from the
Commodity Research Bureau) as an additional variable.
Figure 4: Output gap uncertainty, inflation uncertainty and relative 
output gap uncertainty ratio 
 
 
(a) Real-time data, output detrended by quadratic trend 
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(b) Real-time data, output detrended by Hodrick-Prescott filter 
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(c) Final data, output detrended by CBO measure of potential output 
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(d) Real-time data, output detrended by quadratic trend. Measures are based on 
structural shocks from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) system 
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Table 2: Taylor rule model estimates with uncertainty effects using GMM 
Sample: 1969Q4-2009Q2 
 (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Interest rate equation     
i  
0.84 (0.03) 0.85 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 0.83 (0.03) 
1
y y
y yt t 
 
   

   
   
       
 regime 
,0

  
2.19 (0.30) 2.36 (0.40) 2.16 (0.45) 2.27 (0.32) 
,1

  
-0.83 (0.37) -1.46 (0.45) -1.85 (0.64) -0.79 (0.35) 
Average inflation effect  1.88  1.84  1.49  2.05 
,0y
  0.44 (0.20) 0.40 (0.24) 1.04 (0.40) 0.79 (0.26) 
,1y
  1.23 (0.50) 2.70 (1.01) 1.57 (0.60) 0.61 (0.42) 
Average output effect  0.90  1.39  1.61  0.94 
1
y y
y yt t 
 
   

   
   
       
 regime 
,0

  
1.84 (0.31) 1.76 (0.38) 1.00 (0.31) 1.92 (0.28) 
,1

  
0.84 (0.40) 1.75 (0.71) 1.88 (0.61) 0.82 (0.40) 
Average inflation effect  2.12  2.22  1.56  2.11 
,0y
  1.19 (0.32)  2.98 (1.03)  1.95 (0.65)  1.15 (0.29) 
,1y
  -0.99 (0.41) -4.21 (1.65) -1.53 (0.70) -1.12 (0.40) 
Average output effect  0.85  1.85  1.48  0.81 
Adjusted R
2
 0.96 0.95  0.97  0.96 
Regression SE 0.51 0.66  0.47  0.50 
J stat [0.29] [0.30] [0.32] [0.33] 
 
Notes: All models include an intercept term; estimates of this are not reported. Numbers in parentheses are the 
standard errors of the estimates. J stat is the p-values of a chi-square test of the system’s overidentifying 
restrictions (Hansen, 1982). The instruments are a constant, four lags of the interest rate, inflation and the 
output gap and one lag of inflation uncertainty and output gap uncertainty. 
 (i): Real-time estimates. These use output detrended by a quadratic trend. 
(ii): Real-time estimates. These use output detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott trend. 
(iii) Final estimates. These use output detrended by the CBO measure of potential output. 
(iv): Real-time estimates. These use output detrended by a quadratic trend. Inflation and output gap uncertainty 
measures are based on the structural shocks from a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model in output gap, inflation 
and the interest rate. 
This is routinely added to the VAR in order to limit the price puzzle,
that is, the positive response of prices to interest rate increases (see e.g. Boivin
and Giannonni, 2006 and references therein). Doing so makes no qualitative
di¤erence to what follows. Figure 4d) plots our uncertainty measures based
on the 8-quarter moving standard deviation of the VAR-derived structural
shocks for ination and the real-time output gap (the latter is detrended by
quadratic trend; empirical results based on the CBO measure of potential
output and a HP trend lter were poor and for this reason not reported). In
line with our previous results, the estimates reported in column (iv) of Table
2 suggest that (i) the average ination response increases when there is higher
relative volatility in ination and (ii) the output gap response increases when
there is higher relative output gap volatility; however, the +y;1 coe¢ cient is
imprecisely estimated and the model ts the data worse than the model which
uses nal data in column (iii) of Table 2. All in all, our estimates provide some
evidence of asymmetries in the response to ination and the output gap when
uncertainty is considered.
5 Robustness analysis
At this point, some natural questions inspire a battery of experiments to check
for the robustness of our results16. We rst consider to what extent, if any,
changes in the central bank preferences may a¤ect these results. This question
matters in that policymakerspreferences are not known with certainty and
might also change due to special facts or contingencies. Thus we consider the
case where output gap stabilization is as important as ination stabilization17.
The result of this experiment is reported in Figure 5 and shows that policy-
makerspreferences do not a¤ect the monotonicity or the curvature type of
the paths; they only a¤ect the degree of concavity or convexity of these paths.
We then ask what happens to the case where the multiplicative shocks
exhibit some persistence. Arguably, this could be due to some exogenous
disturbance and/or change in the structure of the economy whose medium
or long-lived nature is not known yet by the policymakers. To address this
question, we introduce some inertia into the Markov chain. Thus, a new
Markov matrix, P , is constructed such that: (i) the probability that the shock
keeps the same value over two periods is equal to 0.5, (ii) the probability that
16The current analysis is conducted with the same parameters used before unless the
experiments require otherwise, in which case the new values for the parameters (e.g. loss
functions weights and transition probabilities) are reported.
17These alternative preferences are captured by setting  = 1;  = 1; and  = 0:2 in the
loss function.
the shock jumps to adjacent values is equal to 0.3, and (iii) by skipping the
adjacent values, the probability that the shock jumps to the closer remaining
values is equal to 0.1. Therefore, P takes the form
P =
266664
0:5 0:3 0:1 0:1 0
0:15 0:5 0:15 0:1 0:1
0:1 0:15 0:5 0:15 0:1
0:1 0:1 0:15 0:5 0:15
0:1 0:1 0:15 0:15 0:5
377775 :
Given the Markov matrix above, its associated stationary distribution for the
shock hjt for h = y;  is given by
hjt
 
1  2h
  
1  h

1
 
1 + h
  
1 + 2h

Pr
 
hjt

0:1598 0:2371 0:2371 0:2371 0:1598
:
Results in this case (available on request) are very similar to the previous ones
based on serially i.i.d. modes.
Finally, we consider to what extent, if any, the realistic policy transmission
lags embedded in the model a¤ect the relation between ination and output
gap uncertainty and optimal policy. We then relax the assumption of a one-
period lag between policy action and output gap response and of a further
one-period lag between output gap and ination changes. Accordingly, the
AD and AS take the more conventional form
yt+1 =

yyt + (1  y) yt+2jt+1   rrt+1 + "yt+1

yt+1
t+1 =

t + (1  )t+2jt+1 + "t+1

t+1
and the vector of state variable is now given by Xt = (t; yt; it 1) : The results
of the experiment are reported in Figures 6-7.Comparing these ndings with
the ones in Figures 2-3 shows that abstracting from transmission lags leads
only to minor quantitative changes.
Figure 5: Optimal policy response to yt and πt+1|t in presence of uncertainty on the 
output gap and inflation processes. Central bank preferences: μ =1, λ =1, ν =0.2. 
 
              (a) output gap uncertainty                                (b) inflation uncertainty  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Optimal policy response to yt and πt with no policy transmission lags and in 
presence of uncertainty on the output gap and inflation processes. Central bank 
preferences:  μ=1, λ=0.1, ν=0.2. 
 
            (a) output gap uncertainty                                   (b) inflation uncertainty  
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Figure 7: Optimal policy responses to yt and πt with no policy transmission lags and in 
presence of relative output gap uncertainty. Central bank preferences: μ=1, λ=0.1, 
ν=0.2. 
 
 
 
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates optimal real-time monetary policy when policymakers
consider the presence of undistinguishable uncertainty about the state and
structure of the economy proxied by the exogenous volatility of the ination
and output gap processes.
First, the paper shows that in presence of undistinguishable uncertainty
either on ination or the output gap, considering this uncertainty in the policy
decisions results in a more aggressive response to the uncertain state variable.
Furthermore, the optimal response to ination is inversely related to output
gap uncertainty while the optimal response to the output gap tends to be
unrelated to ination uncertainty.
Second, in presence of exogenous uncertainty in both the ination and
output gap processes, when there is relatively more uncertainty on ination
than on the output gap, optimal monetary policy resembles the Taylor rule.
On the other hand, when the uncertainty on the output gap exceeds the one
on ination, optimal monetary policy tends to respond more strongly to the
output gap and to ignore ination. Finally, in intermediate cases, the policy
response to the state variables tends to be similar.
These results are based on a preemptive behavior of the central bank aim-
ing to reduce the risk of large deviations of the economy from its long-run
equilibrium, which would deteriorate the distribution forecasts for ination
and the output gap. In an empirical test carried out on the US economy, we
nd that the model predictions tend to be consistent with the data.
The model discussed in the current paper can be extended to allow for the
e¤ects of other types of uncertainty such as exchange rate uncertainty. We
intend to address these issues in future research.
A Details on microfoundations
A.1 Preferences and technology
The economy features a continuum of unit mass of identical households, each
producing a di¤erent variety of a consumption good indexed by j. For the
sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume preferences only
on consumption, see for example Svensson (2000). To obtain realistic inertia in
the household behavior we introduce habits persistence following Abel (1990)
so that the households utility function is
Et
1X
=0
U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+

; U
 
Ct+ ; Ct+

=

Ct= eCt 11  1
1  1

; ;  2 (0; 1) ;
where  denotes the intertemporal discount factor, Ct consumption of con-
sumer/producer j, which is a composite good given by the Dixit-Stiglitz ag-
gregator of the continuum of varieties of the consumption good
Ct 
Z 1
0
(Ct (j))
1  1
# dj
 1
1 #
;
with # > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution among any two di¤erenti-
ated varieties; nally, eCt is aggregate consumption, and  and  denote the
degree of habits persistence in consumption and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution respectively.
As in Flamini (2007) we assume that the composite good used for con-
sumption is also used for production and let Y Pt (j) be the quantity of the
composite good used by rm j to produce its own di¤erentiated variety Yt (j)
with the production function
Yt (j) = f

Y Pt (j)

;
where f is an increasing, concave, isoelastic function. It follows that the input
requirement function for any rm j is given by
Y Pt (j) = V [Yt (j)] ; (9)
where V  f 1; so that the rms variable costs are given by
PtV [Yt (j)] ;
where
Pt 
24 1Z
0
pt (j)
1 # dj
351=(1 #)
is the price of the composite good, and the rms marginal costs are
PtVy [Yt (j)] :
A.2 Steady state
Assuming exible prices, the monopolistic competitive representative rm j
sets the optimal price pt (j) in any period as a markup on marginal costs,
pt (j) = PtVy [Yt (j)] ; (10)
where  > 1 is the desired markup.
Considering the preferences of the household, the demand function for each
variety j is
Yt (j) = Yt

pt (j)
Pt
 #
; (11)
where
Yt =
Z 1
0
Yt (j)
1  1
# dj
 1
1 #
:
Next, rewriting (10) as
pt (j)
Pt
= Vy [Yt (j)] : (12)
and substituting (11) into (12) yields
Yt (j)
Yt
  1
#
= Vy [Yt (j)] : (13)
Now, following Woodford (2003, ch. 3), we notice that the RHS of (13) is
increasing in Yt (j) so that there is a unique Yt (j) that solves this equation
given Yt: Thus in equilibrium each rm will supply the same quantity which
must equal Yt: As a result the steady state level of output, Y; is the solution
to
 1 = Vy (Y ) ;
that is
Y = V  1y
 
 1

:
Since all the rms use the same technology, it also follows that Y Pt (j) = Y
P
t
so that
Y Pt = V (Yt) ; (14)
and using the market clearing condition
Yt = Ct + Y
P
t (15)
we nally obtain that in steady state
Y p = V

V  1y
 
 1

C = V  1y
 
 1
  V V  1y   1
A.3 Aggregate demand
We can now log-linearize (15) around steady state values obtaining
yt = 'ct + (1  ') ypt ; ' 
C
Y
; (16)
where yt  log YtY and denotes the output gap, ct  log CtC ; and yPt  log Y
P
t
Y p
.
Then, recalling that the function f is isoelastic, log-linearizing (14) and sub-
stituting ypt into (16), leads to
yt = 'ct + (1  ') yt;
where the  is the output elasticity the input requirement function (14). Fac-
torizing y yields
yt =
'
1  (1  ')  ct;
and assuming for sake of simplicity but without loss of generality that a per-
centage increase of the quantity produced requires the same percentage in-
crease of the input, that is  = 1; we obtain
yt = ct: (17)
In order to reproduce a realistic one-period lag in the transmission of policy
action to real activity, we assume as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and
Boivin and Giannoni (2006) that consumption decisions are predetermined one
period in advance, specically we let households choose the index Ct at date
t   1: Thus, preferences maximization subject to a budget constraint and a
no-Ponzi condition leads to the following log-linearised Euler equation
ct+1 = yct + (1  y) ct+2jt   (1  y)rt + "yt+1; y 
 (1  )
1 +  (1  ) ; (18)
where for sake of simplicity and without signicant loss in generality we have
approximated rt+1jt with rt: Finally, considering (17), equation (18) can be
rewritten in terms of the output gap as
yt+1 = yyt + (1  y) yt+2jt   rrt + "yt+1; r  (1  y):
A.4 Derivation of the aggregate supply
In order to have a realistic two-period lag in the transmission of monetary
policy to ination we follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and
Giannoni (2006) assuming that pricing decisions are made two periods in ad-
vance. We also assume the Calvo (1983) staggered price scheme and follow
Christiano and al. (2005) in allowing the rms that cannot up-date the price
optimally to index their price to previous ination. Thus, rm j prot maxi-
mization problem is
maxePt+2 Et
1X
=0
t++2
8<: ePt+2	t++1Pt+2+ Yt++2
" ePt+2	t++1
Pt+2+
# #
 V
24Yt++2 ePt+2	t++1
Pt+2+
! #359=; ;
where (1  ) is the probability that in any period the producer choose an
optimal price, 	t++1 

Pt++1
Pt+1

; with  denoting the degree of indexation
to previous period ination when it is not possible to optimally up-date the
price, and nally t and ePt+2 denote the marginal utility of consumption, and
the new price chosen in period t for period t+ 2, respectively. The rst-order
condition is
Et
( 1X
=0
t++2
" ePt+2	t++1
Pt+2+
 V 0
0@Yt++2 ePt+2	t++1
Pt+2+
! #1A35Yt++2 ePt+2	t++1
Pt+2+
! #9=; = 0 ;
where     #
1 # ; which can be rewritten as
Et
( 1X
=0
t++2
"
Xt+2
Q
s=1

t+1+sQ
s=1t+2+s
(19)
 V 0
0@Yt++2 Xt+2Qs=1t+1+sQ
s=1t+2+s
! #1A35Yt++2 Xt+2Qs=1t+1+sQ
s=1t+2+s
! #9=; = 0 ;
where Xt+2  ePt+2Pt+2 and t+2  Pt+2Pt+1 :
In equilibrium any rm that is free to choose the price in period t will
choose the same price, ePt; and the remaining rms that are not free to choose
the price in period t will keep the previous period price updated to the previous
period ination. Thus, the aggregate price is given by
Pt =
24 Pt 1Pt 1
Pt 2
!1 #
+ (1  ) eP (1 #)t
35 11 #
() t =
h
1  (1  )X(1 #)t
i  1
1 #

1
1 #t 1:
Then we log-linearize the rst order condition around the steady state.
Let us allow bounded uctuations in (t; Xt; t; Yt) around the steady state
(; 1; 1; Y; ) and let small letters be log-deviations from their steady state
value. Then we obtain
v
0
= !y (j) ; (20)
t = t 1 +
1  

xt; (21)
where ! > 0 is the elasticity of V
0
with respect to Yt (j) : Then, log-linearizing
(19) yields
Et
( 1X
=0

"
xt+2  
X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+1+s)
 !
 
yt++2   #
 
xt+2  
X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+1+s)
!!#)
= 0
which can be rewritten as
Et
( 1X
=0

"
(1 + !#)
 
xt+2  
X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+1+s)
!
  !yt++2
#)
= 0 :
(22)
Now note that
1X
=0

X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+2+s 1) =
1X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+1+s)
1X
=s

=
1X
s=1
(t+2+s   t+1+s) 
ss
1  
=
1
1  
1X
=1
 (t+2+   t+1+ ) :
Then, equation (22) can be rewritten as
Et
(
1 + !#
1   xt+2  
1 + !#
1  
1X
=1
 (t+2+   t+2+ 1) 
1X
=0
yt++2
)
= 0
()
Etxt+2 = Et
( 1X
=1
 (t+2+   t+2+ 1) + 1  
1 + !#
1X
=0
!yt++2
)
= Et

 (t+2+1   t+2) + 1  
1 + !#
!yt+2

+ Etxt+2+1:
Next, approximating  by unit in order to ensure the Natural-rate hypothesis
and combining the previous equation with (21) we obtain
t+2jt =

(1 + )
t+1jt +
1
(1 + )
t+3jt +
(1  )2
(1 + ) (1 + !#)
!yt+2jt:
Finally, adding the error term "t+2 +

1+
"t+1 to both sides of the previous
equation yields
t+2 =

(1 + )
t+1 +
1
(1 + )
t+3jt +
1
(1 + )
(1  )2
 (1 + !#)
!yt+2jt + "t+2
= t+1 + (1  )t+3jt + yyt+2jt + "t+2:
B Key elements of the Svensson and Williams
approach
We rst expand the product of the multiplicative shocks with the terms in the
square brackets of the RHS in (1-2) and then rewrite the aggregate demand
and supply in State-space form as
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1xt +B1jt+1it + "t+1 (23)
Etxt+1 = A21jtXt + A22jtxt +B2jtit (24)
where Xt and xt are, respectively, the vectors of predetermined and forward
looking variables
Xt =
 
t; t+1jt; yt; it 1
0
;
xt =
 
yt+1jt; t+2jt
0
;
"t is the vector of additive exogenous disturbances, and nally the matrices
A11jt+1 ; A12jt+1 ; B1jt+1 ; A21jt ; A22jt ; B2jt ; (25)
are random, each free to take nj di¤erent values in period t corresponding to
the nj modes indexed by jt 2 f1; 2; :::; ng :
Turning to the central bank loss function (3), it can be rewritten as18
Et
1X
=0
L (Xt+ ; it+t) ;
where the period loss function can be expressed in matrix form as
L (Xt+ ; it+t) 

Xt
it
0
W

Xt
it

; (26)
and W is a positive semidenite matrix depending on the central bank prefer-
ences. Thus the central bank problem consists of minimizing (26) subject to
(23-24) and (5). Following the approach described in Svensson and Williams
18Notice two di¤erences with the loss function considered in the general case by Svens-
son and Williams (2007) in section 2.1. First, in our model the loss depends only on the
stabilization of ination, the output-gap and the rst di¤erence of the interest rate which
implies that the forward looking variables xt do not appear in the loss function. Second,
there is no uncertainty on the weight to the target variables in the loss function so that the
loss does not depend directly on the modes.
(2007a), this problem, which is not recursive due to the presence of forward
looking variables, needs to be converted to a recursive one. The approach con-
sists in expanding appropriately the state and control space to use the recursive
saddlepoint method developed by Marcet and Marimon (1998). Specically,
the vector of lagged Lagrange multipliers, which will be denoted by t 1; cor-
responding to the forward-looking equations is added as a vector of additional
state variables. Furthermore, the vector of current values of these multipliers,
which will be denoted by t; as well as the expected values of the forward
looking variables themselves, which will be denoted by zt; are added as vectors
of additional control variables. Accordingly, equation (24) is replaced by two
equivalent equations
Etxt+1 = zt;
0 = A21jtXt + A22jtxt   zt +B2jtit;
where zt is a vector of additional forward-looking variables. Then solving the
second equation for xt we obtain
xt = ex (Xt; zt; it; jt) ;
which is a convenient representation of the forward-looking variables in the
application of the Marcet and Marimon method. This method requires to
introduce the dual period loss function
eL eXt; zt; it; t; jt  L (Xt; it)  0tzt + 0t 11 ex (Xt; zt; it; jt) (27)
and nd a saddlepoint for the dual intertemporal loss function
Et
1X
=0
 eL eXt; zt; it; t; jt
such that the dual intertemporal loss function is maximized over ft+g0
and minimized over fzt+ ; it+g0 subject to (23-24) and (5).
To solve this problem, we let st 
 eX 0t; p0t0 denote the perceived state of
the economy where
st+1 
24 Xt+1t
pt+1
35 = g (st; zt; it; t; jt; jt+1; "t+1)

24 A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1ex (Xt; zt; it; jt) +B1jt+1it + "t+1t
P
0
pt
35
and introduce the conditional dual value function which gives the dual in-
tertemporal loss conditional on the true state of the economy (st; jt)
bV (st; j)  Z eL eXt; z (st) ; i (st) ;  (st) ; j+ X
k
Pjk bV [g (st; j; k; "t+1) ; k]
' ("t+1) d"t+1;
8j 2 nj; where ' (:) denotes a generic probability density function and
g (st; j; k; "t+1) is the perceived state of the economy in t+ 1 considering that
in equilibrium the control variable it and the control vectors t and zt depend
only on st. This allows presenting the true dual value function as the average
of the conditional value functions according to the perceived distributions of
modes: eV (st) = EtbV (st; jt) =X
j
pjtbV (st; jt) ; (28)
and the true dual value function, in turns, using the saddlepoint method solves
eV (st) = max
t
min
(zt;it)
Et
neL eXt; zt; it; t; jt (29)
+bV [g (st; zt; it; t; jt; jt+1; "t+1) ; jt+1]o (30)
subject to the law of motion of the perceived state of the economy
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1ex (Xt; zt; it; jt) +B1jt+1it + "t+1
t = t
pt+ =

P
0

pt:
Next notice that if modes were xed we would have a standard Linear Quadratic
problem whose the familiar solution is a quadratic value function and a lin-
ear policy. In the current model, since the belief evolution is exogenous, the
value function is then quadratic in eXt for a given belief, that is for a given
perceived probability distribution pt: In other words the value function is belief-
dependent quadratic which implies that the optimal policy is belief-dependent
linear, specically a linear function of the expanded state eXt for a given pt:
Now the fact that the value function is quadratic in eXt for a given pt;
matters in that it can be expressed in a matrix form. Furthermore, accounting
for (26), the dual period loss function (27) can be also written in matrix form in
terms of the expanded vector of predetermined variables eXt and the expanded
vector of control variables, i.e. eit  (z0t; it; 0t)0 : This allows writing the value
function for the dual problem (28) and the Bellman equation (29) in matrix
form. Then it is possible to obtain a rst order condition with respect to eit
which allows determining the following form of the policy function
eit = eF (pt) eXt; (31)
where eF (pt) is a matrix depending on the perceived distribution of the modes
in period t: It is worth noting that the matrix eF (pt) is unknown as it depends
on the value function matrix which is unknown too at this stage. Then, equa-
tion (31) is embedded in the Bellman equation in matrix form leading to the so
called Riccati equation. The latter is nally used in the algorithm developed
by Svensson and Williams to determine the unknown value function matrix
and the matrix eF (pt) through numerical iterations.
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